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Abstract
We demonstrate refinement-based formal development of the hybrid, ‘fixed virtual block’ approach to train movement control
for the emerging European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) level 3. Our approach uses iUML-B diagrams as
a front end to the Event-B modelling language. We use abstraction to verify the principle of movement authority before
gradually developing the details of the Virtual Block Detector component in subsequent refinements, thus verifying that it
preserves the safety properties. We animate the refined models to demonstrate their validity using the scenarios from the
Hybrid ERTMS Level 3 (HLIII) specification. We reflect on our team-based approach to finding useful modelling abstractions
and demonstrate a systematic modelling method based on the state and class diagrams of iUML-B. The component and control
flow architectures of the application, its environment and interacting systems emerge through the layered refinement process.
The runtime semantics of the specification’s state-machine behaviour are modelled in the final refinements. We discuss how
the model could be used to generate an implementation using code generation tools and techniques.
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1 Introduction
The Hybrid ERTMS Level 3 (HLIII) specification [1] con-
cerns the control of trains moving on a linear track and
communicating by radio and trackside equipment. A train
movement controller called the Radio Block Centre (RBC)
manages the Movement Authority (MA) granted to each train
in mission. The focus of this work, called the Virtual Block
Detector (VBD), conservatively estimates train locations to a
finer granularity than physically detected track sections, and
thus reports free virtual track sub-sections available for train
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movement. Trains and trackside report location data to the
VBD. In turn, the VBD reports free track sections to RBC.
The MA granted to each train consists of a set of sections that
the train is permitted to move into. An MA can be extended
by adding further contiguous sections, or trimmed by remov-
ing sections that the train has passed through. A controlled
train is instructed that the sections in its MA are free, allow-
ing it to travel at full speed. A trusted train is given a special
on-sight MA allowing it to move cautiously through sections
that are not guaranteed to be free; the driver is trusted to avoid
collisions. The key safety property which we verify is that
controlled trains do not run into trains that are ahead of them.
The refinement-based Event-B modelling method [2] is an
appropriate choice since it allows us to verify key properties
while leaving certain features, and interacting components,
abstract and underspecified. The architecture can be lay-
ered through the refinement: each layer can focus on an
abstract component interface, the environment, or a specific
feature of the target system. In their evaluation of seven
competing state-based formal methods, [3] judge Event-B
favourably, and among the best for verification and tool
support. They also find Event-B, while less expressive in
refinement modelling than ASMs [4] and Z [5], to be supe-
rior ‘when it comes to (mechanically) proving and verifying
refinement’, i.e. in proof support. The Rodin [6] toolkit
includes theorem provers and model-checkers. Integration of
diagrammatic UML modelling with Formal Methods is well
established, e.g. [7,8]. Rodin plugins include diagrammatic
modelling notations and tools; we use UML-like iUML-B
class diagrams and state-machines [9–11]. iUML-B leads to
a readable formal specification which is easier for domain
experts to validate [12,13]. For validation of scenarios, we
used the ProB [14] model checker with BMotionStudio [15]
visualisation.
Formal models are often presented as if they were devel-
oped in perfect inexorable steps when, in practice, they never
are. We give an overview of our informal team-based process
illustrating the iterations that involved many misunderstand-
ings, failures and rework. The team consisted of research and
academic staff who had some experience of formal modelling
of railway applications such as interlockings and crossings,
but no previous experience of communications-based, vir-
tual section train control. Although there were frequent and
extensive discussion between the three original team mem-
bers (Dghaym, Poppleton and Snook), the main model entry
and validation and verification (V V) activities were carried
out by one team member (Dghaym). Improved team-working
facilities for Event-B are currently under development to
alleviate this. One team member (Dalvandi) was added for
specialist advice on developing an implementation from the
model.
An early version of this work was published in [16]. The
additional contributions presented here are as follows.
– Our previous models have been revised to reflect the new
version of the specification [1].
– The model is refined to cover more operational details of
the system.
– The model has now been validated using the scenarios
from the specification.
– We propose methods to generate an implementation from
the model.
– We reflect on the process in a more accessible way.
The specification was re-issued partly to take into account the
findings of our earlier work [16] and this was reported as an
impact of the Enable-S3 project. Specifically, the problematic
revoking of an MA has been removed from the specification
although the possibility of an already allocated track section
changing state still remains.
Structure The paper is structured as follows. Section 2
describes our requirements and modelling strategy, giving
a summary of the methods and process we used and recall-
ing Event-B and iUML-B basics. Section 3 describes the
results of our analysis of the system to derive and clarify
the requirements. Section 4 presents the details of our mod-
elling including refinement strategy (Sect. 4.1) followed by a
detailed account of modelling (Sect. 4.2). Section 5 describes
our verification by theorem proof (Sect. 5.1) and validation
by scenario animation (Sect. 5.2). Section 6 discusses ways
to derive an implementation from the model. Section 7 pro-
vides observations about the specification and reflections
on the modelling methods arising from the development.
Section 8 compares our development with other ABZ 2018
publications about the same case study as well as some other
related work. Section 9 concludes by reviewing the work,
its increment over [16] and required future work and tool
improvements.
2 Requirements modelling strategy
The HLIII specification focusses on the operational details
of the VBD component, whereas a formalisation of safety
properties requires an abstract system level description.
Therefore, our first stage was to derive requirements via a
systems analysis which is described in Sect. 3. We then pro-
ceeded to model the system starting with the environment
(ENV) and specifying what we mean by safety before intro-
ducing the concept of movement authority from the RBC
and then VBD operation to ensure safety. Further details
of the model structure are given in Sect. 4. We have not
provided traceability from requirements to the formalisa-
tion. This would be useful further work. The primary aim
and result of our solution is that the safety properties are
clearly formalised and the principle of movement authority
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is proven to be safe (with some caveats) before the opera-
tional details of the VBD are proven to maintain this safety
while also being demonstrated to satisfy the scenarios given
in the specification (again with some caveats). We mod-
elled the requirements fully except that we abstracted away
from length measurements such as ‘minimum safe distance’.
This affects the accuracy of one transition in the operational
state-machine. We also abstracted away from an interval
measurement of time and therefore do not incorporate any
notion of clock in our model. Although the specification
involves a number of time deadlines, each one is a simple
expiry event which can be fully modelled via arbitrary expiry
events without a measure of time. The remainder of this sec-
tion summarises the steps of the process that we followed in
developing the model.
Systems Analysis While the HLIII specification [1,17] is
well presented in terms of explanatory scenarios, its focus
makes it a detailed requirements specification for the VBD.
It does not explain the overall system aims and principles so
well. We therefore started by reverse engineering our under-
standing of the system in order to understand its purpose
and the concepts on which it is based. This involved anal-
ysis of the information in the specification, discussions and
sketching whiteboard diagrams such as components, entity
relationship and state-machine diagrams. The diagram-based
analysis naturally led into the iUML-B modelling. The sys-
tems analysis identifies the main components in the system
and the information flow between them. This is necessary
for the model to reflect the appropriate responsibilities of the
VBD versus assumptions it makes upon other components.
As with most stages of the modelling process, the analy-
sis was iterative. The modelling improved our understanding
of the system, and our new understanding helped us choose
better abstractions for modelling. For example, initially we
assumed that only connected trains were in mission. How-
ever, when modelling we realised that when a connection is
lost the system relies on the fact that the train will continue
to respect its MA and this implies that the train is still in mis-
sion. This new understanding of the system led us to revise
our models so that the ‘in-mission’ state-machine was inde-
pendent of (i.e. parallel with) the connected state-machine.
Refinement Strategy The refinement strategy provides a
plan for building the model; choosing abstractions, adding
details in refinement steps and introducing invariant prop-
erties at appropriate stages. We considered two alternative
approaches: a) start from an abstract safe system or b) start
from an unsafe system and make it safe. In this work, we
chose the second approach. While the first approach is per-
haps more traditional, in this case, the safety properties were
not so obvious and were complicated by unsafe, albeit miti-
gated, scenarios. So we wanted to capture the essence of train
movement before introducing assumptions and progressing
towards details that can distinguish between safe scenarios
and mitigated unsafe scenarios. Again, the refinement strat-
egy evolved as we discovered difficulties and adapted our
approach.
Modelling with Event-B and iUML-B Event-B [2,18] is a
refinement-based formal method for system development.
An Event-B model contains two parts: contexts for static
data and machines for dynamic behaviour. The dynamic
behaviour is specified by variables v, invariant predi-
cates I(v) that constrain the variables, and events. An
event comprises a guard denoting its enabling condition
and an action describing how the variables are modi-
fied when the event is executed. In general, an event
e takes the form of the following definition, where t
are the event parameters, G(t, v) is the guard of the
event, and v := E(t, v) is the action of the event.
e == any t where G(t,v) then v := E(t,v)
end
Event-B is supported by the Rodin Platform [6], an exten-
sible toolkit which includes facilities for modelling, verifying
the consistency of models using theorem proving and model
checking techniques, and validating models with simulation-
based approaches.
iUML-B [9–11] provides a diagrammatic modelling nota-
tion for Event-B in the form of state-machines and class
diagrams. The diagrammatic elements share the repository of
an Event-B model, and contribute to that model. For example,
a state-machine will automatically generate the Event-B data
elements (sets, constants, axioms, variables, and invariants)
to implement the states, and transitions contribute additional
guards and actions to existing events. Class diagrams pro-
vide a way to visually model data relationships providing
an object-oriented style ‘lifting’ which is absent from stan-
dard Event-B. Classes, attributes and associations are linked
to Event-B data elements (carrier sets, constants, or vari-
ables) and generate constraints on those elements while class
methods contribute additional guards and actions to existing
events. Note that iUML-B is designed to be a diagrammatic
representation of Event-B and is syntactically and semanti-
cally different from UML. For example, there is no notion
of triggers or ‘run to completion’ in iUML-B, transitions are
enabled and may fire when their source state is active and
their guard is true. Where several transitions and/or methods
are linked (i.e. contribute) to the same event, they must all
fire together. This gives a way to synchronise transitions in
different state-machines.
For modelling, we used iUML-B for its diagrammatic
notation which follows on from the diagrams used in our anal-
ysis and review stages. We used automatic theorem provers
to verify our Event-B models and the ProB model checker to
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find counter examples when the theorem provers could not
discharge proof obligations.
Review We held regular reviews to discuss problems with
the modelling. As indicated in the previous steps, the reviews
led to significant iterations to our understanding of the sys-
tem, revisions to our refinement plan and consequent changes
to the model. Problems fell into the following categories:
– We cannot prove this proof obligation (PO)—look for
a better modelling approach. Example: Contiguity of
next_VSS relationship. We found it difficult to prove con-
tiguity properties about Virtual Sub-Section (VSS) using
properties of the sequence, the obvious Abstract Data
Type model; [19] discusses some of the difficulties of
modelling with such ADTs. To avoid such effort, we used
numeric indexing of VSS , thus relying on the contiguity
of a range of integers. We retained the next function for
elegance of expression in guards and actions. Figure 2a
of Sect. 4.2.1 presents the VSS class properties.
– This is not a useful refinement—change refinement strat-
egy. Example: we wished to introduce features such as
timers as soon as it was possible to do so (i.e. when
the triggering functionality was available). However, we
had not yet introduced the relevant VSS state changes to
utilise the timeout. To rectify this, we altered our refine-
ment strategy to introduce abstract versions of VSS states
and associated transitions before introducing timers. This
is explained in more detail in Sect. 4.2.2.
– This is not a true data refinement—change systems anal-
ysis. Example: as we modelled the flow of information
through the control components, we found it difficult
to reconcile the reported train positions and controlled
MA with the safety properties of the abstract environ-
ment. It seemed that we would need to introduce some
form of responsiveness assumptions to limit the differ-
ence between actual and control variables. However, the
specification implied that the VSS states were asyn-
chronously updated. As our understanding of the MA
principle improved, we realised that the position inaccu-
racy is of no consequence and we adjusted our systems
description accordingly.
Validation Once the model had been refined to include the
operational details of the VBD, the model was animated to
validate it against the example scenarios given in the specifi-
cation. For this validation stage, we created a BMotionStudio
visualisation of the railway system and developed a new ‘sce-
nario checker’ plug-in that automatically animates internal
processes of the model and records/replays scenarios involv-
ing the external interfaces.
3 Requirements resulting from system
analysis
The HLIII specification is a detailed description of one com-
ponent (the VBD) of a wider system that controls train
movements. The other components involved in the system
are the trains and trackside equipment, which we refer to
as ENV, and the RBC that calculates movement authorities
limiting the movement of trains.
The VBD receives messages from trains and train detec-
tors. It also receives information about the output of the RBC.
It calculates a range of sections that it believes to be free of
any trains and sends these to the RBC. The RBC sends to
each train, a movement authority consisting of a range of
sections that the train may move into. The train is instructed
either that the sections are all free or that they might not be
free. We wish to model and verify item 3, the VBD. To do
this, we also need to consider (and model) the other 2 items.
The environment consists of a linear track divided into
fixed sections (Virtual Sub-Section (VSS)) with trains mov-
ing in one direction on the track. Detectors (Trackside Train
Detection (TTD)) report when a train is present. However,
there is only one TTD for a range of VSS. There are two
kinds of trains: those that communicate with the control sys-
tem, and those that do not. Trains that communicate send
three items of information to the VBD:
– their current position (more precisely than track sections),
– the length of the train,
– whether the train is confirmed as integral (i.e. the car-
riages are still all connected together).
Communicating trains are able to receive information about
the range of sections they are allowed to move through
and whether the authorised track is guaranteed to be free
(full-supervision) or not (on-sight). For the purpose of this
description, we partition trains into three kinds: ghost trains
(that are not communicating), controlled trains (that are
communicating and the control system authorises to move
through sections of track which it guarantees to be vacant),
and trusted1 trains (that are communicating and the control
system authorises to move through sections of track which
may be occupied). Trains that do not communicate can only
be detected by TTD and may move freely subject to cer-
tain assumptions concerning physical limitations and those
imposed by train design regulations.
The RBC grants movement authority (permissions) to the
communicating trains. The RBC uses information it receives
from the VBD about which VSS are free. An MA consists
of a range of track sections that the train is allowed to move
1 Controlled and trusted (trains) are terms that we have introduced,
they are not terms from the specification.
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through. Under RBC control, an MA is dynamically extended
from the front VSS, and trimmed from the rear VSS. The
train is also instructed as to whether it needs to be respon-
sible for avoiding collisions with trains in front (On-Sight
Movement Authority (OSMA)) or whether it can assume the
track sections are free (Full Supervision Movement Authority
(FSMA)). Note that the specification makes the assumption
that OSMA is safe. It is not within the scope of this study
to consider whether this is justified. We assume the RBC
always issues safe FSMA in accordance with the informa-
tion it receives from the VBD. That is, all sections in an
FSMA are ones that the VBD has calculated to be free.
The VBD is responsible for deciding which VSS are free
based on information it receives from the TTD and from Pos-
itive Train Detection (PTD) communications received from
communicating trains. It sends information about which VSS
it believes are free to the RBC. Since PTD reports may be
intermittent or interrupted and some trains do not commu-
nicate at all, the estimate of free VSS is cautious in these
circumstances.
The positions of trains that are communicating are known
fairly accurately (subject to some lag in communications)
from the PTD data sent by the train (position, length and
integrity) as well as physical limits on possible train move-
ment in between communications. The position of the train
is defined by the range of sections from that occupied by the
rear to that occupied by the front; this may be a single section.
Some robustness is necessary to accommodate limitations of
the communication mechanisms such as temporary loss of
communication, etc.
The position of a train that is not communicating (i.e. a
ghost train) is difficult to determine. This is estimated as a
range of sections based on the following:
– its last known position (from a PTD or a loss of integrity),
– how far it could possibly have travelled since its position
was known,
– information from trains and free TTD that delimits its
movement range.
A ghost train is created in the VBD by one of the follow-
ing means: a communicating train stops communicating, a
TTD spontaneously and unexpectedly detects a train, or a
communicating train reports that it has lost integrity.
For loss of integrity, a ghost train is created just behind
the communicating train to represent the detached section
of carriages. A communicating train is converted to a ghost
train if the train’s mute timer expires (after communication
is lost) or if it sends a mission-end message and terminates
communication. A ghost train is removed (i.e. destroyed) by
sweeping. Sweeping is the movement of a trusted train (with
OSMA) through the sections where the ghost train may be.
If the trusted train is able to pass through these sections, the
ghost train is judged not to exist. A ghost train may also be
converted to a communicating train if it starts communicating
with the VBD (either by sending a mission start communi-
cation or by re-starting previous communication).
4 Model details
Our formalisation of the requirements uses iUML-B which
imparts a modelling style into the generated Event-B. Our
strategy for developing the refinements is shown in Sect. 4.1
Further details of the strategy and modelling style are shown
in Sect. 4.2 which illustrates how we modelled (a) the ENV
(Sect. 4.2.1), (b) the RBC and (c) the VBD (Sect. 4.2.2).
4.1 Refinement strategy
The model consists of an abstract level and ten refinements,
with an additional extension refinement for scenario vali-
dations using ProB and BMotionStudio. Each refinement
introduces more details about the behaviour. In most cases,
this is done by superposition, where new data and associated
behaviour are added without changing that of the previous
level. In some cases, a data refinement is performed where
some variables of the previous level are replaced and an
invariant gives the correspondence between the state of the
old and new data. Both superposition and data refinement
refine the behaviour of the system since the behaviour is
modelled based on the new data.
ENV-M00 Trains This is the abstract level of the model. It
defines a linked list of trains to keep track of train order
and prevent overtaking. Trains are created at the rear of
the linked list and removed from its front. We also allow
adding a new train in the middle of the linked list as a
result of train split.
ENV-M0 Train movement, VSS Introduces the train move-
ment in terms of VSS section updates, where a VSS
section is either free or occupied by a train. The train
movement is modelled as an update of the position of
either the train front or the rear.
ENV-M1 Ghost vs connected trains Distinction between
connected and ghost (i.e. non-connected) trains, where
all new trains join as ghost.
ENV-M2 TTD Introduces TTD sections which can be either
free (no train on any of its VSS) or occupied (a train on
at least one of its VSS). The TTD state is immediately
updated by train movement events.
RBC-M3 RBC RBC can grant trains MA. We call a train
with MA inMission, where the RBC may extend its MA
while connected.
VBD-M4 Position reporting Introduces the reported versus
actual train position with the associated MA trimming.
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We also introduce the memorised location of a train
resulting from communication loss.
VBD-M5 Controlled vs trusted trains Introduces the con-
cept of available VSS as an abstraction to the detailed
VSS state transitions table presented in [1]. Fully super-
vised FS (controlled) vs on-sight OS (trusted) trains are
also introduced. An OS train has unsafe MA (i.e. can
include not available VSS) but is assumed not to crash
into the back of other trains. An FS train has safe MA
and therefore cannot crash into the back of other trains.
VBD-M6 Integrity loss If a train reports integrity loss as a
result of either train split or changed length, the train is
considered non-integral.
VBD-M7 Waiting timers Defines three different states for
timers: Idle, Started or Expired. Waiting timers apart
from the shadow train timer B are introduced at this level.
VBD-M8 VSS State-machine Distinguishes three different
types of trigger that initiate the VSS state-machine: TTD
information, position reports (PTD) and timer expiry. The
abstract VSS state-machine is refined to the four states:
free, unknown, ambiguous and occupied. The propaga-
tion timers and any remaining timers are modelled at this
level.
VBD-M9 Lower levels Full VSS state transition as per spec-
ification, where transitions from one state to the other are
refined to model the different alternatives.
4.2 Modelling
The model consists mainly of three parts: the ENV, RBC and
VBD. Compared to our HLIII model presented in [16], the
ENV part has not changed much. Since we abstract away
the details of how the RBC calculates a movement authority,
it is dealt with in a single refinement which is not changed
in this version. The VBD is modified to conform to the new
version of the specification document [1] and to complete the
modelling of the VSS operational state-machine.
4.2.1 Modelling the environment
In the first refinements, we focus on modelling the ENV and
the possible trackside events, such as train movement, split-
ting and loss of communication.
Entering and Leaving HLIII Area In the previous version of
the specification [17], the entry/exit of a HLIII area was not
mentioned. In our ABZ paper [16], at the abstract level we
introduced how trains can join and leave the network. This
is similar to the updated specification [1], which includes
a new section to describe how trains can enter/exit a HLIII
area. Compared to [16], we only updated the event names to
conform to the specification.
Fig. 1 Class diagram representing dynamic aspects of the environment
Fig. 2 Class diagram representing the track in the context
In the model shown in Fig. 1, the variable (green icon)
class train, with superset TRAIN (purple star icon indicat-
ing a carrier set), represents the trains that currently exist in
the HLIII area. There are two cases for entering an HLIII
area, i.e. for creating trains: either a train can join from the
beginning of the network (method Env_enter_HL3_area in
class train) , or in the middle as a result of splitting behind
an existing train (method Env_train_split in class train). An
important property at this level is: trains cannot overtake,
which is why we introduce the relative ordering of the trains,
represented by the variable association next_train between
instances of class train. Therefore, a train can only exit an
HLIII area if there is no train immediately in front: this is rep-
resented by the guard tr /∈ dom(next_train) added to method
ENV_exit_HL3_area of class train.
Trackside and Train Movement In the context, we model
the network topology using iUML-B class diagrams (Fig. 2).
First, we introduce the TRAIN class (not shown in figures),
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Fig. 3 Train communication state-machine
then the VSS with their linear layout enforced by indexing
via attribute VSS_i, as shown in Fig. 2a.
In the next refinement, we model train movement. A train’s
position is given by the range of VSS that it occupies: variable
association occupiedBy in Fig. 1. We only model trains mov-
ing forward, hence a train can only leave a VSS if it occupies
the next one. In order to ensure the no overtaking property, a
train can only move forward if it does not share a VSS with
its next train. Apart from splitting, a train can only enter a
HLIII area from the first VSS and trains can only leave from
the last VSS. Since the no-overtaking property is fundamen-
tal to the safety of the system, we ensure the model does not
break it by introducing the following invariant, which states
that a train cannot occupy a VSS with an index higher than
the lowest indexed VSS of the next train:2
∀tr1,tr2· (tr2 → tr1) ∈ next_train ⇒
max(VSS_i[occupiedBy ∼ [{tr2}]]) ≤
min(VSS_i[occupiedBy ∼ [{tr1}]])
To distinguish between trains that are communicating and
those that are not, we introduce sub-states connected and
ghost, of train (Fig.3).
Next, we introduce the TTD which groups sets of
contiguous VSS via association Sections (Fig. 2b). Class
occupiedTTD, which is a sub-class of TTD, represents those
TTD that have at least one of their VSS occupied by a train. At
this level, we distinguish two cases when a train is leaving the
last VSS of the TTD: i) no other train occupies the TTD and
the TTD becomes free (and is removed from occupiedTTD)
or ii) it remains occupied and not free. The same applies to
a train exiting a HLIII area which can also free a TTD.
Movement Authority In the final environment model, we
introduce the RBC role which paves the way for the VBD
part. The RBC provides movement authorities (MA) which
we assume trains will respect. The MA is modelled as a vari-
able association ma between train and VSS. We refine the
2 Where ∼ is an inverse relation and [] are relational image. A con-
cise summary of Event-B syntax is available at http://wiki.event-b.org/
images/EventB-Summary.pdf.
Fig. 4 Parallel state-machines for communication and movement
authority
train state-machine further by introducing a parallel state-
machine (Fig. 4). The sub-states, inMission and noMission,
distinguish the mission status of trains. inMission repre-
sents trains that have performed a Start of Missi (SoM)
(transition ENV_start_of_mission), while noMission repre-
sents trains that either did not start, or performed an End
of Mission (EoM) (transition ENV_end_of_mission). The
mission state-machine was introduced as a parallel state-
machine to the communication state-machine so that trains
that lose communication retain their mission status. All con-
nected trains have a mission. This is ensured by the invariant:
connected ⊆ inMission
We also split each of the radio connection/disconnection
transitions in Fig. 3 into two cases to distinguish between
SoM and reconnection vs connection loss and EoM. The tran-
sitions ENV_start_of_mission and ENV_end_of_mission
are common to both state-machines. Note that when a train
first enters a HLIII area, it enters as a ghost train with no
mission, and when leaving the HLIII area it also has to exit
as a ghost train with no mission.
When a train performs SoM, it is immediately granted an
MA for the VSS it occupies. However, this does not allow
the train to move to new VSS sections. In order to move
forward, the RBC should extend the MA as shown by the self-
transition RBC_extend_ma of the connected state in Fig. 4.
Our assumption that trains with a mission respect their MA
is enforced by the inMission class invariant: occupiedBy ∼
[{tr}] ⊆ ma[{tr}] 3.
In [16], we discussed how revoking ma (e.g. due to prop-
agation of an unknown VSS state) can result in an unsafe
state if the actual train position has progressed sufficiently
to occupy the revoked part of the ma. In the updated version
of the specification [1], the notion of revoking ma has been
removed; section 4.2.1.6 states that the ma will be impacted
depending on implementation. It seems there are special mea-
sures for these cases to ensure safety, which are not part of this
specification document. We therefore simplified our model
by removing the RBC_shrink_ma event and the associated
unsafe attribute flag described in [16] which was designed
3 Note that class invariants are implicitly quantified over instances of
the class, hence the antecedent ∀tr· trinMission is added automatically.
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to highlight the unsafe area of operation. We now verify that
safety is ensured by ma which is never revoked. In Fig. 1,
RBC_trim_ma in the connected class plays the role of a
garbage collector, removing the VSS the train has left behind.
4.2.2 Modelling the VBD
The VBD cannot see directly what is happening in the ENV;
it depends on periodic reports (PTD) sent by the train, and it
then asynchronously updates the VSS states. Similarly, the
RBC receives information about VSS state from the VBD.
This asynchronous behaviour relies on the fact that the actual
train position cannot be behind that last reported and is some-
where within the MA. That is, the reported position is only
used to free VSS after a train has passed. This is embodied in
the following invariants of class connected which relate the
actual position occupiedBy with the reportedPosition seen
by the VBD.
inv1 : min(VSS_i[reportedPosition[{tr}]]) ≤
min(VSS_i[occupiedBy ∼ [{tr}]])
inv2 : max(VSS_i[reportedPosition[{tr}]]) ≤
max(VSS_i[occupiedBy ∼ [{tr}]])
In [16], these invariants were part of class inMission, but
the new version of the specification introduces memorised
location, which is the last location known to the VBD, before
the train lost its connection or ended its mission. Figure 1
presents the association memorisedLoc between ghost and
VSS. The same invariants, inv1 and inv2, apply to trains with
a memorised location.
MovementAuthority VSSAvailability In the next refinement
of the VBD, we distinguish between the two different modes
of MA: FSMA and OSMA. In FSMA mode, the RBC only
uses free VSS to extend ma. In OSMA mode, the RBC can
extend ma with any VSS since we trust the OSMA trains
not to crash into the rear of the next train. This behaviour
is modelled in Fig. 5 by partitioning inMission into two dif-
ferent sub-states, controlled and trusted representing FSMA
Fig. 5 Introducing sub-states to represent FSMA and OSMA modes
and OSMA modes, respectively. The choice between the two
transitions, RBC_extend_os_ma and RBC_extend_fs_ma, is
non-deterministic and determines the mode of the train.
Note that when a train performs a SoM, it is granted
OSMA (trusted). This is a design decision we took in [16], to
ensure safety, since a train is initially not connected when it
first enters a HLIII area. In the new version [1], a new section
(4.2.2.1.2) is added which notes the risk and suggests the use
of the ATAF method which uses the OSMA profile to start
the mission.
We can now introduce a safety invariant concerning the
separation of controlled trains; the ma of controlled trains do
not overlap:
∀tr1, tr2· tr1controlled ∧ tr2controlled \ {tr1} ⇒
ma[{tr1}] ∩ ma[{tr2}] = ∅
Hence, the RBC can only extend the ma of controlled
trains using VSS sections that are free and not part of any ma.
We introduce a sub-class availableVSS of VSS to represent
the free VSS sections. This will be refined to the VSS state
free in future refinements as we introduce the state-machine
of the specification. However, extending the ma for trusted
trains does not have these restrictions.
At this level (VBD-M5), we model an abstraction of the
VSS state-machine as shown in the top (m5) part of Fig. 6.
We add events to add and remove availableVSS by general-
ising the conditions that apply for the VSS state transitions.
Therefore, for adding an availableVSS, it either belongs to
a free TTD or no train has reported its position in this VSS,
while for now the only condition for removing a VSS from
availableVSS is that it belongs to an occupied TTD. We also
add an event to model ‘no change in the availability of the
VSS’.
The semantics of the VSS state-machine is a form
of run-to-completion where a trigger event (e.g. receiv-
ing new TTD/PTD information or timer expiry) results in
all the consequently enabled transitions of the VSS state-
machine being fired to update the affected VSS states before
another trigger event is considered. Later, we introduce
the notion of triggers explicitly as a scheduling mecha-
nism for the events that require running the VSS state-
machine.
We use the all-replicator of the Event Refinement Struc-
ture (ERS) [20] approach to model the run-to-completion
semantics of the state-machine, where the state of all the
VSS sections must be updated before completion allows
the next cycle of events. The VBD_vss_no_change event
introduced in the last refinement simplifies completion by
removing the need to calculate what needs to be com-
pleted.
Integrity Position Reports Next, we introduce the concept
of train integrity. We partition connected into two sub-states:
integral and nonIntegral. We also refine the PTD posi-
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Fig. 6 ERS representation of the VSS state-machine
tion reports to include integrity information. Therefore, we
split the method VBD_receive_position_report into differ-
ent cases for confirming integrity, integrity loss, integrity not
available and train length change. The difference between
the position report events is that when integrity is confirmed,
both front and rear positions are updated. However, when
integrity is not confirmed, only the front position of the train
is updated and in later refinements this will have an effect on
the integrity timers.
VSS State-machine and Timing We introduce timing at
VBD-M7, by introducing TIMER_STATUS which can be
either Idle, Started or Expired. We model time abstractly
with an ordinal scale, non-deterministically allowing run-
ning timers an opportunity to expire. In later refinement, the
expired timers will trigger the VSS state-machine to run. The
timers are initially Idle, and some events or transitions will
result in changing the timer state to Started. For example,
a train mute timer will be started when a position report is
received. At this level, we introduce all waiting timers except
the shadow train timer B which depends on VSS sub-states
yet to be introduced. The shadow train timer B, similar to
shadow train timer A (inv3), is assigned to each TTD to mit-
igate the risk of a shadow train following an integral train.
The timers introduced at VBD-M7 are defined as follows,
where the last two invariants represent relationships between
the state of timers and the train state.
1 @inv1: muteTimer ∈ train→ TIMER_STATUS
2 @inv2: waitIntegrityTimer ∈ train→ TIMER_STATUS
3 @inv3: shadowTrainTimerA ∈ TTD →TIMER_STATUS
4 @inv4: ∀tr·tr ∈ dom(memorisedLoc) ⇒muteTimer(tr) =
Expired ∨tr ∈ noMission
5 @inv5: ∀tr·tr ∈ train ∧waitIntegrityTimer(tr) =
Expired ⇒tr ∈ nonIntegral
The mute and wait integrity timers (inv1, inv2) are total
functions from train to TIMER_STATUS, so are assigned to
every train entering a HLIII area. In the case of ghost trains
that never establish a connection with the trackside, these
timers will remain Idle and will never be started. While the
shadow train timer A (inv3) is a total function from TTD to
TIMER_STATUS, it is associated with every TTD section.
Invariant inv4 ensures that a train with a memorised loca-
tion is either a train with expired mute timer (i.e. a train that
lost its connection with trackside) or a train that ended its
mission. Invariant inv5 ensures that the state of a train with
expired wait integrity timer is nonIntegral.
At the next VBD-M8 level, we introduce the full VSS
state-machine from the specification document, as shown in
Fig. 7. The free state refines the previous availableVSS, and
the three states occupied, unknown, ambiguous correspond
to non-available VSS sections. Therefore, all the transitions
going to the free state will refine VBD_add_available_vss,
and all the transitions leaving the free state will refine
VBD_remove_available_vss, and finally the remaining tran-
sitions will refine VBD_vss_no_change.
In Fig. 7, we model the abstract 12 transitions of the VSS
state-machine with additional self-loops for each of the four
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Fig. 7 The VSS state-machine in iUML-B
states. The numbers in front of the transition names corre-
spond to the transition numbers shown in m8 of Fig. 6 and
the transitions described in the specification document.
The guards for self-transitions are the conjunction of
the negated guards of all other transitions from the same
source state. In other words, the self-transition only enables
when no other transition is enabled to leave that state.
The grey m8 part of Fig. 6 demonstrates how the events
VBD_add_available_vss,VBD_remove_available_vss and
VBD_vss_no_change are decomposed to the VSS state tran-
sitions.
We also introduce the concept of triggers, which explicitly
initiate the running of the VSS state-machine. The presence
of a trigger is a guard forVBD_start_vss_update in Fig. 6. We
extend the context to distinguish between PTD, TTD, timer
expiry and startup triggers. (The startup trigger is only used
for the initial state to update the VSS sections starting initially
as unknown.) The state-machine cannot start dealing with
another trigger until it completes updating all the VSS states.
To simplify the model, we only allow one trigger at a time.
This has the disadvantage of always giving some triggers
priority over others. In our case, TTD triggers have a higher
priority. We also introduce the propagation timers and the
remaining waiting timer. When the state-machine completes
the VSS state update (VBD_vss_update_complete), it will
reset the trigger and the propagation timers.
In the last VBD-M9 refinement, we decompose the state-
machine transitions to model the different alternatives as
presented in the specification table of the VSS state-machine,
and add all the remaining details.
5 Verification and validation
In our modelling approach, we start by verifying safety at the
earlier stages of the model and then later focus on validating
the VBD system. We prove safety using the MA concepts,
where in [16] we show that revoking MA can result in an
unsafe state. However, in the latest version of the specifica-
tion [1], the notion of revoking MA is removed. Therefore,
we remove the RBC_shrink_ma event from our model. How-
ever, there remain questions about how MA can be impacted
and the conditions that can result in its change. MA is an
essential part of the system and to prove safety of the model,
more details should be provided.
After verifying system safety, we focus on introducing
the details that help us in modelling the VBD state-machine,
which is the main concept in the specification document.
The table describing the state transitions of the VBD state-
machine is very difficult to follow, hence the provided
operational scenarios play a major role in validating the
model. For validation, we use ProB and BMotionStudio to
run the scenarios. We use BMotionStudio to display the main
variables in a tabular format. This provides the criteria for val-
idating the scenarios. For example, we present the VSS state,
the actual position of the trains and their reported positions,
as shown by the upper left part of Fig. 8. We have also used
the CODA Oracle Simulator [21] to record and replay the
event traces when running the scenarios. This is shown in
the lower left part of Fig. 8.
5.1 Verification
Most of the manually verified proofs are related to invariants
involving min and max, where we used case distinctions to
consider boundary cases. Take, for example, the proof of the
no-overtaking invariant for ENV_front_move_next in ENV-
M0. This proof requires the consideration of several cases:
the train is the following train (tr_p), the train is the fol-
lowed train (tr_n), further sub-cases such as the VSS is in
the occupiedBy, etc. In the next iteration of the model, we will
look at improving the degree of automation by introducing
additional theorems.
When defining the variable types, we try to apply total
functions instead of partial functions as much as possible, e.g.
reportedPosition and timers; this improves discovering miss-
ing guards and actions. Moreover, we ‘lift’ the state-machine
to a set of instances (train). Therefore, the generated state-
machine-type invariants are based on subsets of the instance
set (train), which makes it easier to define the whole domain
of the functions.
5.1.1 Proof statistics
In Table 1, we present the proof statistics of our model. Our
modelling resulted in 621 proof obligations. The number that
is discharged automatically varies depending on the proof
tactic profile used and the machine. Our best results were
obtained using a proof tactic profile that includes the ‘rele-
vance filter’ RF (using ML and PP from the AtelierB provers)
and then runs the SMT solvers (CVC4 and Z3). The rele-
vance filter is a meta-prover that improves the efficiency of
the selected theorem provers by localising relevant theorems.
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Fig. 8 Validation Example Using ProB and BMotionStudio
Table 1 Proof statistics: customised auto-tactics
Name Total Auto Manual Und.
ENV_C00 0 0 0 0
ENV_C0 7 7 0 0
ENV_C1 2 0 2 0
ENV_C3 0 0 0 0
VBD_C7 0 0 0 0
VBD_C8 0 0 0 0
ENV_M00 4 4 0 0
ENV_M0 29 26 3 0
ENV_M1 18 18 0 0
ENV_M2 11 11 0 0
ENV_M3 64 62 2 0
VBD_M4 107 95 12 0
VBD_M5 32 32 0 0
VBD_M6 60 60 0 0
VBD_M7 66 66 0 0
VBD_M8 139 137 2 0
VBD_M9 82 75 7 0
Total 621 593 28 0
In the best case, we achieved 95% automatic proof but this
dropped to about 88% on slower machines. For comparison,
the best result using the default prover configuration of Rodin
(after installing AtelierB provers) was 47%.
5.2 Validation: role of ERTMS operational scenarios
When validating the scenarios, we instantiated the model
with the example given in the scenario to be able to animate
and compare the results. In some cases, we have recorded a
partial pass. This means we detected some differences, but
managed later to synchronise and get the same results. In the
following, we describe the results of running the scenarios
and the corresponding changes to the model.
Scen. 1 A normal scenario for integrity confirmation. Pass
after updating #6A guards as a result of running step 4. In
the specification, #6A states a VSS changes from occu-
pied to free if an integral train leaves the evaluated VSS.
We added to the Event-B model an additional condition
to take into account a free TTD.
Scen. 2 Train splitting with confirmed integrity. Pass after
updating #11A as a result of running step 7. We add a
guard to transition #11A that takes into consideration that
an integral train has left the rear TTD. This condition is
explicitly mentioned in the reference section 4.5.1.4 of
the specification.
Scen. 3 Shadow train scenario. Partial pass, we do not model
travel distance, hence shadow train timer B is started
resulting in enabling #11B in step 7.
Scen. 4 Start and end of mission. Pass, similar to scenario 2
because it runs steps 6 to 8 of scenario 2.
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Scen. 5 Integrity loss. Partial pass, we have different states
in steps 3 and 7. The main reason of the discrepancy is
that we do not model delay in TTD communication and
always give priority to TTD triggers over PTD.
Scen. 6 Train disconnecting and reconnecting. Partial pass,
resulted in updating #1B, changing the state of a VSS
from free to unknown, to start the ghost propagation timer.
Scen. 7 Connection loss and reconnection with VSS release.
Partial pass, resulted in updating transitions related to
#8 (changing the state from occupied to ambiguous),
by adding the guard that TTD is occupied. The addi-
tional condition is not described in the specification table.
Moreover, fixing the priority guards of #12 (unknown to
occupied) over #5(unknown to ambiguous). We model
transition priorities by negating the guards of the higher
priority transition. Discrepancies in step 6 because we do
not run the state-machine twice and separate the update
of the front and rear positions of the train.
Scen. 8 Sweeping the track and the jumping train effect. Fail,
step 4 demonstrates the need to separate front and rear
position updates by running the state-machine twice.
Scen. 9 Ghost train. Partial pass, requires strengthening self-
transitions to make the state-machine deterministic, this
is left for the next iteration when an automatic tool is
developed to generate the run-to-completion conditions.
For now, we always give normal transitions a priority
over self-transitions when running the scenarios.
Looking at the results, our model fails in the case of jump-
ing trains. Jumping trains, as defined by [1], are trains that the
trackside cannot locate due to the discrete position reports
and/or delay in trackside detection. Jumping trains are not
mentioned much in the specification, and the solution of how
to avoid this effect is not very well explained. The problem
is we do not run our VBD state-machine twice to separately
update the front and the rear positions. During our valida-
tion phase, we discovered that this is important to avoid the
jumping train effect but it is not explained in the later version
of the specification [1]. In our current solution, in the case
where integrity is not confirmed, we update the VBD posi-
tion in one step by prepending the new position to the front of
the current position. We assumed this would be equivalent to
running the state-machine twice, but it does not eliminate the
jumping trains effect. Listings 1 and 2 show the difference
between assigning reportedPosition (@act1) in the events
VBD_receive_position_report_integrity_confirmed and
VBD_receive_position_report_integrity_loss. In the case
where integrity is confirmed, we set the train position (report-
edPosition) to be the reported position (pos) of the train;
hence, the rear is updated as well as the front. However in the
case of integrity loss, the train position becomes the union
of the current position (reportedPosition) and the reported
position (pos_new) so that the rear is not updated. The wit-
ness (keyword with in listing 2) gives the refinement relation
between the new and old parameters. The rest of the guards
are needed to determine the possible position values and the
other actions to set the state of the train as integral or not.
1 event VBD_receive_position_report_integrity_confirmed
2 refines VBD_receive_position_report
3 any tr pos
4 where
5 @instanceType_tr: tr ∈ connected
6 @grd1: pos ⊆ma[{tr}]
7 @grd2: pos =∅
8 @grd3: min(VSS_i[pos]) ≤ min(VSS_i[occupiedBy∼[{tr}]])
9 @grd4: max(VSS_i[pos]) ≤ max(VSS_i[occupiedBy∼[{tr}]])
10 @grd5: tr /∈ train_split
11 @grd_contig: VSS_i[pos] = min(VSS_i[pos]) .. max(VSS_i
[pos])
12 @grd6: min(VSS_i[pos]) ≥ min(VSS_i[reportedPosition[{
tr}]])
13 then
14 @leave_nonIntegral: nonIntegral := nonIntegral \{tr}
15 @enter_integral: integral := integral ∪{tr}
16 @act1: reportedPosition := ({tr} −reportedPosition) ∪
({tr}× pos)
17 end
Listing 1 Position and Integrity Confirmation Event
1 event VBD_receive_position_report_integrity_loss
2 refines VBD_receive_position_report
3 any tr pos_new
4 where
5 @instanceType_tr tr ∈ connected
6 @grd1: pos_new ⊆ma[{tr}]
7 @grd2: pos_new =∅
8 @grd3: min(VSS_i[pos_new]) ≤ min(VSS_i[occupiedBy∼[{tr
}]])
9 @grd4: max(VSS_i[pos_new]) ≤ max(VSS_i[occupiedBy∼[{tr
}]])
10 @grd5: tr ∈ train_split
11 @grd_contig: VSS_i[pos_new] = min(VSS_i[pos_new]) ..
max(VSS_i[pos_new])
12 @grd6: min(VSS_i[pos_new]) ≥ min(VSS_i[
reportedPosition[{tr}]])
13 with
14 @pos: pos = pos_new ∪reportedPosition[{tr}]
15 then
16 @leave_integral: integral := integral \{tr}
17 @enter_nonIntegral: nonIntegral := nonIntegral ∪{tr}
18 @act1: reportedPosition := reportedPosition ∪({tr}×
pos_new)
19 @act2: train_split := train_split \{tr}
20 end
Listing 2 Position and Integrity Loss Event
In Fig. 8, we show how running step 4 of scenario 8 results
in an event error. This problem is captured by the provers
(Fig. 9), where we cannot prove the contiguity guard in
VBD_receive_position_report_integrity_loss because of a
weakened guard between VBD-M5 and VBD-M6 in the case
of integrity loss. When decomposing the position reporting
event to distinguish between the integrity cases in VBD-M6,
we introduce a new parameter pos_new which is contiguous
but the witness replacing pos is not. In this case, running
scenario 8 has highlighted a problem in our model, helped
us to understand why we could not discharge the proof obli-
gation, and why we actually need to run the state-machine
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Fig. 9 GRD Proof Obligation
twice to update the VBD position. The solution is to make a
clear distinction between three types of positions: the envi-
ronment position, which we modelled as occupiedBy, the
position reports and the VBD position (reportedPosition)
which requires running the state-machine twice in case of
PTD and TTD triggers. Since we need to separate the VBD
position update into two steps, modelling the position report
as a parameter (pos) in the position reporting events is not
enough, and it needs to be recorded as a variable. This update
requires another iteration of the model. After this, we will be
able to prove that the VBD positions are contiguous, but the
position reports in comparison with previous reports are not
necessarily contiguous (i.e. jumping train effect).
6 Towards implementation of VBD
We previously mentioned that the focus of this work is on
modelling and verification of VBD. However, in order to be
able to model and verify different safety requirements such as
no-collision, we also had to model other parts of the system,
i.e. ENV and RBC. In this section, we briefly explore some
of the possible options for generating executable code from
our model and introduce a new approach for generating code
using an experimental tool.
One of the possible approaches for code generation is to
use Tasking Event-B [22] code generation tool. To be able to
use Tasking Event-B, we will need to refine the VBD model
further until we have concrete data structures and events.
Due to this, the first step for using the tool and also tackling
the complexity of the model (through separating different
components of the system) could be model decomposition
[23]. Decomposing VBD from the rest of the model will
allow us to focus on this component and refine it towards a
concrete level. At the most concrete level, we should provide
explicit control flow for the model. The tool is able to generate
code for a number of different target languages based on
the provided control structure and the model. The tool has
been used with Rodin 3.3 for generation of executable code
from an Event-B model of an intelligent runtime management
software for multi-core embedded platforms [24].
Tasking Event-B has some limitations that makes it diffi-
cult to use in some cases. For instance, the tool facilities for
defining program structure is restricted (e.g. nested structures
are not supported) and only supports concrete structures [24].
Since the gap between the abstract data structures used in
our model and concrete data structures that should be used
in an efficient implementation is rather large, and due to the
aforementioned limitations, Tasking Event-B could not be
used until the model is further refined. Based on this, we
decided to use a new experimental tool called SEB-CG [25]
for providing some suggestions on how we can derive code
from our abstract model.
SEB-CG implements the ideas presented in [26] and [27]
where Event-B models are augmented with a schedule. The
schedule makes the control flow between events explicit from
the abstract level by allowing schedule refinement along with
the Event-B refinement. Similar to Tasking Event-B, gener-
ating executable code with SEB-CG can be done if the model
is refined to a concrete level. However, the SEB-CG support
for abstract control structures (i.e. iterations and choices)
in addition to concrete ones (i.e. loops and branches) and its
flexibility in defining nested program structures makes it use-
ful for deriving the algorithmic structure of the model even
if the final concrete model is not constructed yet.
Using SEB-CG, we initially introduce an abstract sched-
ule for the most concrete model of VBD:
1 schedule code0
2 machine VBD_M9_Anim1
3 proc vbd(in:vss_in)
4 begin
5 VBD_start_vss_update
6 do
7 {
8 1A_free_unknown
9 []
10 1B_free_unknown
11 []
12
.
.
.
13 []
14 self_ambiguous
15 []
16 self_occupied
17 }
18 od
19 VBD_vss_update_complete
20 end
The above schedule has two main purposes: 1) it groups rel-
evant VBD events using the proc construct (not all events
are shown) and 2) it provides explicit abstract control flow
between events. do..od is an abstract iteration and { ...
[] ... } is a non-deterministic choice. Elements in a
schedule are executed based on the schedule order. We refine
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the above abstract schedule towards a more concrete one as
follows:
1 schedule code refines code0
2 machine VBD_M9_Anim1
3 proc vbd(in:vss_in)
4 begin
5 VBD_start_vss_update
6 do
7 if(vss_in ∈ f ree ∧ vss_in /∈ updatedV SS ∧
tr igger = T T DI n f o ∧ (∃t td.t td = Sections−1(vss_in)
∧ t td ∈ occupiedT T D
∧ Sections[{t td}] ∩ ma[controlled] = ∅
∧ Sections[{t td}] ∪ ran(reported Posi tion) = ∅))
8 {
9 1A_free_unknown
10 }
11 elseif(vss_in ∈ f ree ∧ vss_in /∈ updatedV SS ∧
vss_in /∈ ran(reported Posi tion) ∧
(∃vss_prop.vss_prop = vss_in ∧
Sections−1(vss_prop) = Sections−1(vss_in) ∧
disconnect PropagationT imer(vss_prop) = Expired ∧
(∀v.V SS_i(v) > min(V SS_i[{vss_prop, vss_in}]) ∧
V SS_i(v) < max(V SS_i[{vss_prop, vss_in}]) ⇒
v ∈ ( f ree ∪ unknown))) ∧ vss_in /∈ ran(reported Posi tion))
12 {
13 1B_free_unknown
14 }
15
.
.
.
16 od
17 VBD_vss_update_complete
18 end
The above schedule refinement refines the abstract choice
given in schedule code0 to concrete if..else branches.
The explicit branch conditions are extracted from the respec-
tive event guards. Since the model is still abstract, some of
the computations required for deciding which case should be
executed are specified using event parameters and guards. At
this stage, we translate those parameters and their guards to
an existential quantifier. These existential quantifications can
be seen as the specification of other procedures, so if there is
a procedure that satisfies this existential quantification then
the quantification in the branch condition can be replaced
by a procedure call to that procedure (which should return a
boolean value) in code level. Using an approach similar to
[28], it is possible to transform the guards to a set of pre- and
post-conditions in a language which is supported by a static
verifier and then implement and verify the aforementioned
procedures there.
Using the above approach, we can gain insight into the
structure of the final implementation even though the model
is not refined to a concrete level yet. The difficulty of refining
the Event-B model of a complex example, such as the one
in this paper, to a level where all the event parameters and
abstract data structures can be replaced by concrete variables,
suggests the need for a combinational approach where high-
level properties are specified and verified in Event-B and low
level code-oriented properties are verified using a program
verifier.
7 Other observations
In this section, we identify some ambiguities and limitations
in the HLIII specification document and suggest improve-
ments. We also suggest some improvements to the tools based
on our experience of modelling the HLIII, some of which are
already in progress.
Specifications The specification document [1] mentions
several times, ‘while the MA is still valid’; however, the doc-
ument does not explain when an MA becomes invalid. As we
have shown in [16], revoking an MA can lead to an unsafe
state. Similarly, the specification mentions that the MA can
be ‘impacted’, but does not explain how. In some scenarios
(e.g. scenario 6), the MA has changed between steps. We
assume this is a mistake in the specification since otherwise
the MA appears to have been revoked. As mentioned earlier
in Sect. 5.2, the rationale for running the VSS state-machine
twice in the case of TTD and PTD trigger events should have
been explained and emphasised more. This led to us making
incorrect assumptions about the behaviour of our model. In
the VSS state-machine transitions table [1], the condition for
#6A is ‘integral train has left the evaluated VSS’. When mod-
elling the conditions for the transitions, we missed the case
where TTD is free. Although this is covered by an integral
train leaving the VSS, it was only discovered by running the
scenarios. It would be better to present this condition clearly
as a separate transition (i.e. introduce new condition #6B:
TTD is free). Moreover, transition #7A changing the state
of a VSS from occupied to unknown, if the evaluated VSS
is part of a train memorised location with an expired mute
timer or no communication session, has a priority over #6A
which changes the state of the VSS from occupied to free.
Does this priority still hold if TTD is free?
In scenario 6, which covers the case of a train losing its
radio communication and later reconnecting, there is a dis-
crepancy with Sec. 3.4.2.2.2 in p.16 of [1], which describes
the change in the VSS state-machine to free as one of the
stopping events for the disconnect propagation timer. On the
other hand, in steps 4 5, when vss12 becomes free the timer
should be stopped according to p.16. Hence, it cannot expire
in step 5. The scenario also did not mention the start of the
propagation timer for vss21 and vss22, because both sections
are part of a train MA for which the mute timer has expired.
In this case, one of these timers can expire and the transition
should be #1C instead of #1D in step 5 of scenario 6, i.e. the
VSS state will become unknown due to the expiry of a prop-
agation timer on the same TTD (#1C) rather than a different
TTD (#1D).
Tooling The iUML-B diagrammatic notation helped us to
express and communicate the models between the team mem-
bers and followed naturally from our system analysis and
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Fig. 10 Textual Representation of iUML-B
review meetings. In later stages when substantial reworking
of the model was required, the diagrams somewhat hindered
progress because changes often have to be repeated through-
out the refinement chain. As a result, we intend to improve
the refactoring features of iUML-B tooling.
Modelling a specification such as HLIII involves iterative
review and refactoring over refinements which is made more
cumbersome by having to re-draw diagrams. Textual repre-
sentations can be more efficient to refactor using simple text
copy and paste operations. We are currently developing a
textual representation of iUML-B using Xtext [29], which is
also beneficial for tracking changes and supporting version
control. Figure 10 shows a snippet of a textual representation
of a state-machine.
It would have been useful to be able to structure the model
into components for VBD, RBC and ENV. Model composi-
tion tools, based on inclusion of machines [30], are available
but are not yet compatible with iUML-B. We are developing
a containment mechanism so that iUML-B can be used with
inclusion. In future work, we will re-structure the model to
assess these composition techniques.
Our experiences of replaying large and detailed scenarios
gave us strong motivation to improve tool support for run-
ning scenarios. The CODA Oracle Simulator has some useful
features but still requires each event of the system and con-
troller to be manually selected in the correct sequence. When
replaying scenarios, any differences in state or enabledness
due to a change in the model are discovered and halt the
reply. This could be improved if the user was able to config-
ure which are the important observable variables and events
that should match the recording and which are internal detail
that may be allowed to vary.
8 Comparison
Our work on the HLIII specification began in the case study
track of the ABZ 2018 conference. In this section, we com-
pare our approach [16] with the six other contributions to the
ABZ 2018 Case study track.
Three of these approaches [31–33] are based on Event-B
and use theorem proving to verify the main principles behind
the specification irrespective of scenarios. These contribu-
tions, like ours, are based on abstraction and refinement rather
than the operational details of the VBD scenarios. Of these
theorem proving contributions, Mammar et al. [33] covered
the most detail including the VBD state-machine behaviour,
albeit in a rather cumbersome last refinement with a single
update event. Fotso et al. [32] use a goal structured analysis
(KAOS) to drive the refinement structure but do not model the
closed system (i.e. including environment). Abrial’s Event-B
contribution [31] focuses on synthesising a clearer state-
ment of the requirements and consequently does not progress
beyond the first abstract model. The model does, however,
include a substantial, though simplified, subset of the require-
ments which prove the main principle of the VBD. We agree
with Abrial that the specification is operational (or analytic)
in nature. Hence, our systems analyses to extract the require-
ments of the VBD subsystem and our reports of increasing
our understanding through iterative modelling attempts.
The remaining three contributions do not attempt any
abstraction but model the concrete specification as faithfully
as possible in order to model check or animate it to discover
bugs against the scenarios. Cunha et al. [34] do this using
Electum (an extension of Alloy) and the Analyzer model
checker, and Arcaini et al. [35] use Promela with the Spin
model checker. Hanson et al. use ProB to execute ‘classi-
cal’ B [36] to demonstrate the specification controlling an
actual (test) railway system. This contribution does not need
to model the environment since it validates via ‘Model-in-
the-loop’.
Although our ABZ contribution lacked the VBD state-
machine behaviour needed to validate scenarios, we have
now ‘caught up’ by making further refinements to model
the state-machine via a triggering process. In this paper, we
attempt to achieve the best of both: the proof of the abstract
principles of safe operation and the validation of the opera-
tional specification against its scenarios.
Train control is a familiar domain for Formal Methods,
and specifically for B and Event-B-based approaches. Butler
et al. [37] give a methodical treatment of the diagram-
matic modelling of the rail interlocking system Railground
with both iUML-B and Event Refinement Structures [38].
In [19], the authors present the Event-B development of a
Communications-based Train Control (CBTC) system from
Hitachi Ltd. Their focus is on the use of Abstract Data
Types (ADTs) to manage the complexity of modelling a
graph-based rail network and its dynamics. This example
is comparable to European Rail Traffic Management Sys-
tem (ERTMS) Level 3 and uses moving blocks. The authors
further proposed [39] the extension of iUML-B to support
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diagrammatic modelling of ADTs, using the same Rail-
ground case study as [37].
Other related work such as [40] on Hybrid ERTMS Level
3 is based on moving blocks. These models are hybrid, being
concerned with continuous modelling of exact train position
and speed reporting. This ABZ2018 case study is the first
formal examination of fixed virtual blocks that we are aware
of.
9 Conclusions
To summarise, we have performed a full formal development
involving the following:
– Systems analysis to synthesise requirements from a
detailed operational specification.
– Iterative formal modelling to develop our understanding
of the requirements.
– Abstraction of the environment and important safety
properties as a formal model.
– Refinement to introduce an abstract model of the VBD
control component.
– Refinement to introduce operational details of the VBD
control component.
– Use of diagrammatic modelling notations to increase
understanding and structuring of the models.
– Validation of the models by animation of the given sce-
narios.
– Preliminary work towards generating an implementation.
The result is a formal model of the VBD specification that is
proven to be safe (with some caveats that still need clarifica-
tion) and has been demonstrated to accurately represent the
specification’s behaviour.
Our formal verification using theorem provers, of the
safety of the HLIII specification, has been extremely ben-
eficial in identifying potential problem areas. While industry
experts are aware of the engineering decisions behind the
specification, unverifiable safety requirements have encour-
aged re-consideration of some critical behaviours in the
specification. To influence a major European standard is a
significant achievement. Our model captures the abstract
principles behind HLIII and refines them with the full oper-
ational details of the specified state-machine behaviour.
For validation, we used a ‘scenario checker’ plug-in tool to
enhance ProB animation and BMotionStudio to visualise the
state being checked. We discovered one area in the scenarios,
where our model deviates from the expected behaviour. The
failure of the ‘jumping trains’ scenario requires a new itera-
tion of the model, where we will mainly focus on updating
the VBD front and rear position separately.
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